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During the recent Pullman strike, labor leaders assembled at
Chicago, and arbitrarily decided whether the industry of the coun-
try should be throttled because a stubborn millionaire insisted on
his legal rights. It is not supposed that these gentlemen consulted
much law, or that any regard for the "fundamental" rights of
their fellow citizens to life, liberty and the pursuit of "happiness"
played a large part in their deliberations. It is not even supposed
that the certain prospect of property destroyed, and' the dreadful
spectacle of citizens shot down by armed soldiery, in the event of
a strike ordered, turned the scale. It is very generally supposed
that they decided the question with sole reference to its "expedi-
ency" for their various unions.
During the same strike, at least two governors of far distant
States telegraphed the leader of the strike for "permission" to
run trains in their own territory, and within the jurisdiction of
their own laws. The same leader declared in effect, that he had
violated no law, either in letter or spirit, in launching strikes whose
consequent disorders required suppression by troops in many
States, and caused loss of life and great destruction of property;
and the declarations of labor leaders very generally justified him.
The events of this strike were, in a large measure, an epitome
of the long history of labor disorders. It shows the growth of an
arbitrary power within the ostensible government of law, and far
more absolute in its control of the working lives of vast numbers.
It is a power which largely ignores the law and resents its inter-
ference in any strike as tyrannical.'
Herbert Spencer, after investigating our political system, de-
clared that it never contemplated the control of thousands of votes
by one man: and that its success under such conditions was yet to
be proved. It is equally true that our system of law never con-
templated that men should act, not as individuals, but in organized
masses, powerful enough to practically dictate the terms on which
men shall hire and be hired. The groping of judges after firm
law in labor cases, and its rapid modification, show this clearly
enough.
I The repeated denunciation of the U. S. Courts by labor organizations,
since the Chicago strikes, bear out this assertion.
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The conflict in the cases only mirrors the very obvious conflict
between the right of labor to act as an organized unit and the as-
sumed right of the employer and non-organized workmen to follow
their occupations without interference. The law has varied much as
judges have inclined to the point of view of the employer or the
employ6. But the trend of the law has been distinctly in favor
of organized labor. Up to the present century, a combination of
workmen to raise the rate of wages by any means whatever, was
a criminal conspiracy at common law.2
It required a statute to drive the fact of their legality into the
heads of the British Judiciary. But in Regina v. Rowlands,
3 it
was said, "The intent of the law is at present to allow either of
them, employer and employed, to follow the dictates of their own
will with respect to their own actions and their own property, and
either, I believe, has the right to study to promote his own advan-
tage or to combine with others to promote their mutual advantage."
In Rogers v. Evarts,4 it was said, "irrespective of any statute
I think, the law now permits workmen, at least within a limited
territory, to combine together, and by peaceable means to seek any
legitimate advantage in their trade. -The increase of wages is such
an advantage. The right to combine involves of necessity the
right to persuade co-laborers to join the combination. The right
to persuade co-laborers involves the right to persuade new em-
ploy6s to join the combination. This is but a corollary of the
right of combination."
In State v. Donaldson 5 (1867) it was held a criminal conspiracy
for workmen to agree to quit work in a body unless their em-
ployer would discharge at their demand objectionable fellow
workmen, and Chief Justice Beasley said in his decision: "1 If the
manufacturer can be compelled in this way to discharge two or
more hands he can by similar means be coerced to retain such
workmen as the conspirators may choose to designate. So his
customers may be prescribed and his business may be in other
respects controlled. I cannot regard such a course of conduct as
lawful. * 1 * There is this coercion. The men agree to leave
simultaneously in large numbers and by concerted action. The
threat of workmen to quit the manufacturer under these circum-
stances is equivalent to a threat that unless he yields to their
2 Anon 12, Mod., 248; Rex. v. Journeymen Tailors, 8 Mod. ii; Rex. v.
Eccles, i Leach 276; Rex. v. Hammond, 2 Esp. 719; People v. Melvein,
2 Wheel. 262; People v. Trequier, i Wh. Cr. Cas. 142; People v. Fisher, 14
Wend. 9; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. iii.
8 17 Q. B. 671. 4 x7 N. Y. Supp. 265. 5 32 N. J. i55.
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unjustifiable demand they will derange his business and thus cast
a heavy loss upon him." In Curran v. Tredeoven 6 '(i89 i) Lord
Chief Justice Coleridge recorded the modem view: "To tell an
employer that if he employs workmen of a certain sort the work-
men of another sort in his employ will be told to leave him; and
to tell the men when the employer will not give way 'to leave
their work, use no violence, use no immoderate language, but
quietly cease to work and go home,' is certainly not intimidation,"
and consequently not illegal, and in this country the right to
strike unless an employer refuses to employ non-union labor is
supported.7 Nobody is under a legal obligation to cultivate the
society of people not agreeable to him. And workmen are under
no legal compulsion to work with fellow employ6s they do not
like. The assertion of the right may be senseless and insult-
ing, but for this the law has no remedy. But while workmen
may quit working with persons they dislike they cannot under-
take to force them to join the union by inducing an employer
to discharge them if they refuse. In such a case the court said: 8
"This looks very much like unlawful coercion, or what amounts
to the same thing, conspiracy. The defendants had a perfect right,
as we have seen, to unite with this or any other labor organization,
but they had no right to insist that others should do so, and when
they made plaintiff's refusal to join it a pretext for depriving him
of his right to labor, they interfered with his personal liberty to
an extent the law will not contemplate." But as an employer can
legally agree to employ none but union men, the decision has little
value as a practical protection to non-union workmen. The true
distinction between the legal and illegal action of combined labor
is found clearly stated in Walker v. Cronin, 9 and reaffirmed in the
great case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor. 10 In the first
case it was declared: "Everyone has a right to employ the fruits
and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit.
He has no right to be protected against competition, but he has a
right to be free from malicious and wanton annoyance. If dis-
turbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise
of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless
some superior right, by contract or otherwise, is interfered
with. But if it comes from the merely wanton and malicious acts
6 L. R. 2 Q. B. (1891) 564.
7 Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 269.
8 Curran v. Galen, 22 N. Y. Supp. 826.
9 107 Mass. 565.
10 23 Q. B. 598.
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of others without the justification or the service of any lawful
interest or lawful purpose it then stands upon a different footing."
A merchant may increase his business at the expense and final
ruin of his rival. But the rival has no complaint. It is the for-
tune of war, and the inevitable evil of a competitive business sys-
tem. So workmen may strike and peaceably persuade others to
strike to compel the payment of higher wages by the business
losses necessarily resulting. This is the industrial weapon they
may use for the attainment of any betterment in their position
which is not in itself condemned by law as illegal, 1' and they may
voluntarily delegate this right to abandon work to labor union
officials who, in the honest performance of the trust, may legally
order strikes for any purpose for which the delegators themselves
may legally strike.
"The individual may feel himself alone unequal to cope with the conditions
that confront him, or unable to comprehend the myriad of considerations that
ought to control his conduct. He is entitled to the highest wage that the strat-
egy of work or cessation from work may bring and the limitations upon his in-
telligence and opportunities maybe such that he does not choose to stand upon his
own perceptions of strategic or other conditions; his right to choose a leader-
one who observes, thinks and wills for him- a brain skilled to observe his
interest, is no greater pretension than that which is recognized in every other
department of industry."12
But where the motive is not to gain a legitimate advantage but
primarily or solely to inflict malicious injury, the agreement to
strike is a criminal conspiracy and the striking itself illegal. 13 The
distinction is technically interesting, but practically its value
appears limited. In the vast majority of strikes the intent to
injure is so confused with the purpose to attain a legitimate end
like higher wages that the law cannot distinguish them. And as
men have a right to join unions and agree to their laws, and as
unions include employ6s in different establishments, the union may
order sympathetic strikes and undertake peaceable boycotts in all
employments, for the purpose of obtaining higher wages or other
betterment of labor in one.
It is evident that the principle may be so construed as to
legally justify almost any conceivable strike where the intention
to coerce by inflicting vindictive injury is not openly proclaimed,
11 Compare Farmer's L. & T. Co. v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals (not yet reported); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 576; Rogers v.
Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 269; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. 598.
12 Charge of Judge Grosscup to the Grand Jury in the indictment of the
officials of American Railway Union, July, 1894.
18 Cases cited in preceding note. Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 269.
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or the purpose of the strike is not to compel an employer to do
something illegal, as in the Chicago railroad strikes.
The vague and hackneyed assertions of the earlier cases that
"any interference" with the free conduct of an employer's busi-
ness by combined workmen is illegal, must be largely modified in
the light of these decisions. Its paraphrase must be that any com-
bined attempt to coerce an employer or employ6 by force or intim-
idation is illegal, whether men quit work or do not quit work in its
execution. And under these doctrines, what legal habitation or
home has the boycott? No mode of enforcing a demand has called
forth more stern rebukes from the courts than this method of bus-
iness assassination. Yet, can any sound legal distinction be drawn
between the right of organized strikers to peaceably persuade other
workmen to withdraw their labor from an obnoxious employer, and
the peaceable persuasion of customers and merchants to withdraw
their patronage from him?
A great deal of confusr,1 law on labor strikes is due to confused
definition. A recent decision that all strikes were illegal 14 caused
great perturbation of the general legal mind. The court had, how-
ever, defined a strike as in effect an attempt to coerce an employer
by force. Naturally, it could not impart an illegal element into
the definition, and then declare the thing defined legal. The log-
ical non-sequitur of the decision was in assuming that because some
strikes, or perhaps most strikes, had been accompanied by force,
therefore all combined quitting work must be accompanied by the
use of violence to attain the demand. Decisions based on such
logic might render any act whatever illegal.
The modern decisions hand over a large portion of the personal
liberty of society in trust to labor organizations. A non-union
workman may be theoretically free-but practically he may be
shorn of his ability to obtain work and the very bread of life by
the arbitrary opposition of a labor union. The mere existence of
such organizations exercises a very real restraint on an employer's
free conduct of business; while the members of such unions are
enslaved by its laws to any strike policy the majority, under the
influence of labor agitators, may adopt. The recognition of the
genuine benefits attainable by the cooperation of workmen, and a
fair acknowledgement of the necessity of fighting the despotic ten-
dencies of massed capital by organization, cannot conceal the
threat to free speech, free action, and free commerce implied in
these organizations, and too often emphasized by their history.
14 Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 6o Fed. Rep. x.
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Such a vast power can be consistent with the public welfare only
where its use is scrupulously just.
As was said by Judge Powers in State v. Stevens, 59 Vt.:
"The exposure of a legitimate business to the control of an association
that can order away its employ6s and frighten away others that may seek its
employ, is a condition of things utterly at war with every principle of justice,
and every safeguard of protection that citizens under our system of govern-
ment are entitled to employ."
The use of menace, threat or force, by organized labor, for any
purpose whatever, is criminal. 15 Boycotts are usually criminal con-
spiracies, because their sole aim is too generally to extort compli-
ance by a threatened injury to business. In Crump v. Com.16 it
was said: "a wanton, unprovoked interference by a combination
of many with the business of another, for the purpose of constrain-
ing that other to discharge faithful and long tried servants, or em-
ploy whom he does not wish or will to employ; an interference
intended to produce or likely to produce annoyance and loss to that
business, will be restrained and punished by the criminal law as
offensive to the individual, injurious to the prospects of the com-
munity; and every attempt by force, threat or intimidation, to deter
or control an employer in the determination of whom he will employ,
or what wages he will pay, is an act of wrong and oppression, and
every and any combination for such a purpose is an unlawful con-
spiracy. The combination is the offense." 1
7
The element of threat or menace possesses high legal interest,
because the remarkable use of the injunction in recent cases has
been largely based upon it. The principle that a man may hire
and be hired without coercion, is as old as the common law. The
use of the injunction to restrain the invasion of the principle is
a distinctly new development of the law in seeking an effective
remedy.'8
The extremely rare use of the injunction is a surprising fact,
in view of the wanton and remediless destruction of property
caused by vindictive boycotts. Its justification in such cases
15 It will also support an action for damages where resultant in injury.
Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 3o Fed. Rep. 48.
16 84 Va. 927.
17 The same principle is very strongly asserted in State v. Stewart, 59 Vt.;
State v. Glidden, 55 Conn.; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 413; in re
Higgins, 24 Fed. 217; and many other cases there cited.
18 Previous to i8go there had been with the exception of receivership cases,
but one reported case in this country restraining workmen from interference
with business, and this went on the ground of restraining a continuing trespass
to land. See Mayer v. Journeymen's Asso., 47 N. J. Eq. 519.
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was impliedly asserted by Judge Blodgett in Emack v. Kane: 19
II cannot believe that a man is remediless against persistent and continued
attacks upon his business, such as have been perpetrated by these defendants
against the complainant, as shown by the proofs in this case. It shocks my
sense of justice to say that a Court of Equity cannot restrain systematic and
methodical outrages like this, by one man upon another's property rights. If
a court of equity cannot restrain an attack like this upon a man's business, then
the party is certainly remediless, because an action at law in most cases would
do no good, and ruin would be accomplished before an adjudication would be
reached. True, it may be said that the injured party has a remedy at law, but
that might imply a multiplicity of suits, which euity often interposes to relieve
from; but the still more cogent reason seems to be that a court of equity can,
by its writ of injunction, restrain a wrong doer, and thus prevent injuries which
could not be fully redressed by a verdict and judgment for damages at law.
Redress for a mere personal slander or libel may perhaps be properly left to the
courts of law, because no falsehood, however gross or malicious, can wholly
destroy a man's reputation with those who know him. But statements and
charges intended to frighten away a man's customers and intimidate them from
dealing with him, may wholly break up and ruin him financially, with no
adequate remedy, if a court of equity cannot afford protection by its restrain-
ing writ."
In Cceur d'Alene Con. Min. Co. v. Miners' Union,20 the dis-
tinctive element of threat or intimidation is shown to distinguish
such cases. from libel.
"A clear distinction will be observed between the two classes of cases
above noted. In the one where the acts complained of consist of such misrep-
resentations of a business that they tend to its injury and damage to its propri-
etor, the offense is simply a libel; and in this country the courts have with
great unanimity held that they will not interfere by injunction, but that the
injured party must rely on his remedy at law. On the contrary, where the
attempt to injure consists of acts or words which will operate to intimidate and
prevent the customers of a party from dealing with, or laborers from working
for him, the courts have with nearly equal unanimity interposed by injunction.
In the one case it is an injury to a man's business by libeling it; in the other
by force, threats and other like means, he is prevented from pursuing it; and
while the damage might be'as great in the one case as in the other-but most
likely with different consequences to the good order and peace of the commu-
nity-the courts have determined2l on different remedies."
Some very significant decisions have been given as to what
constitutes a threat. The upshot of them all is that any attitude
19 Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. Rep. 47, a patent case where defendant tried
to ruin plaintiff's business by threatening his customers with suits for infringe-
ment of patents.
20 5x Fed. Rep. 267.
21 In Mayer v. Journeymen's Asso., 47 N.J. Eq. 5i 9, this distinction is somuch
ignored that the court declares the only English case in which a court issued
an injunction to restrain the circulation of intimidating circulars by a labor
union overruled by an entirely different case which declared that an injunction
,could not restrain a simple libel !
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of the workmen which so excites the fears of fellow workmen or
customers as to drive them away will justify the use of the injunc-
tion to restrain it. The remarks of Mr. Justice Brewer 2 are
worth quoting:
"Supposing one (workman) is discharged and the other wants to stay and
is satisfied with his employment; and the one that leaves goes around to a
number of friends and gathers them, and they come around, a large party of
them -as I suggested yesterday-a party with revolvers and muskets-and
the one that leaves comes to the one that wants to stay and says to him, ' Now,
my friends are here; you had better leave; I request you to leave.' The man
looks at the party that is standing there; there is nothing but a simple request
-that is, so far as the language which is used; there is no threat; but it is a
request backed by a demonstration of force, a demonstration intended to
intimidate, calculated to intimidate, and the man says, Well, I would like to
stay; I am willing to work here, yet there are too many men here: there is too
much of a demonstration; I am afraid to stay!' Now the common sense of
every man tells him that this is not a mere request; tells him that the language
used may be very polite, and be merely in the form of a request, yet it is
accompanied with the backing of force intended as a demonstration and calcu-
lated to make an impression, and that the man leaves really because he is
intimidated."
In Sperry v. Perkins,2 3 a boy tramped up and down the side-
walk in front of the boycotted factory with a banner inscribed with
the peremptory device, "Lasters are requested to keep away from
P. P. Sperry's. Per order L. P. U." (Lasters Protective Union).
They kept away. The court in enjoining the boy and banner said:
"The act of displaying banners with devices as a means of threats and
intimidation to prevent persons from entering or continuing in the employment
of the plaintiffs was injurious to the plaintiffs and illegal at common law."
In Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Un.,24 a union tried to boycott a
newspaper by sending the following genial notice to the agents:
"This union will consider it a great favor for you to give up the
agency of the Commonwealth; if you do not we will have to consider
you the enemy of organized labor." The court enjoined the send-
ing out of such notices, saying that in fact a threat was intended.
It appears accordingly that employers may resort to an injunction
to restrain any acts whatever tending to constrain by fear or
alarm the will of others to his prospective injury.25
22 In re Doolittle, 23 Fed. Rep. 547. 23 147 Mass. 147. 24 45 Fed. Rep. 143.
2- See also remarks of Baron Bramwell, Rex v. Smith et al., io Cox. Cr.
Rep. 6oo; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 289, where the threat of a labor organ-
ization to denounce a shop as a "scab shop," and its workmen as "scab work-
men," if it employed non-union labor, was held to constitute criminal conspir-
acy, the court saying: "The anathemas of a secret organization of men com-
bined for the purpose of controlling the industry of the others by a species of
intimidation that works on the mind rather than the body, are quite as danger-
ous and generally more effective than acts of actual violence."
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But the broad injunctions issued during the recent Chicago
strikes, covering a score of interstate railroads, and* forbidding
even the sending of letters and telegrams to instigate strikes on
such roads were not based on this inherent jurisdiction of equity
merely. They mainly rested on the judicial interpretation of cer-
tain sections of the interstate commerce law, and the anti-trust
law of i89o.26
The use of these statutes to restrain labor organizations has
been singularly ironical. They were passed largely at their own
instance t6 control the very railroads they have been fighting, and
it is altogether probable that their effect on labor organizations
was not considered.2 7
In Toledo, Ann Arbor & N. M. R. Co. v. Penn. Co.,28 it was
held that any strike undertaken to compel a railroad to refuse to
receive and forward interstate freight was a criminal conspiracy
against the laws of the United States, under sections io, and 3 of
the interstate act, and that the court might compel, by a manda-
26 The second paragraph of Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act'(24 St.
at large, p. 379) provides: "All common carriers subject to the provisions of
this act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable,
proper and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective
lines and for the receiving, forwarding and delivery of passengers and prop-
erty to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall
not discriminate in their rates and charges, between such connecting lines."
Section io of the act as amended (25 St. at large, p. 855) provides that I IAny
common carrier subject to the provisions of this act or, when such common car-
rier is a corporation, any director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee or
lessee, agent or person acting for or employed by such corporation, who alone
or with any other corporation, company, person or party * * * shall will-
fully omit or fail to do any act, matter or thing in this respect required to be
done, or shall cause or willingly suffer or permit any act, matter or thing so
directed or required by this act to be done, not to be done, or shall aid or abet
such omission or failure, * * * shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall, upon conviction thereof in any district court of the United States
within the jurisdiction of which such offense was committed, be subject to a
fine not exceeding $5,ooo."
Section 544o Rev. St. U. S. provides: "If two or more persons conspire
* * to commit any offense against the United States * * * and one
or more parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties
to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not more than $io,ooo, or to
imprisonment of not more than two years, or to both fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court." U. S. v. Stevens, 44 Fed. Rep. 132.
The interstate commerce act (26 Stat. at large, 209) provides: "Every con-
tract or combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
to be illegal."
27 U. S. v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 6o5. 28 54 Fed. Rep. 733.
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tory injunction, the chief executive officer of a labor organization
to rescind a strike order issued for that purpose.
A decision even more far reaching in its consequences was ren-
dered by Judge Billings in United States v. Workingmen's Amal.
Asso.,29 where a labor union was enjoined from ordering a boycot-
ting strike on transportation agencies in New Orleans engaged
in interstate commerce, to compel the employment of only
union men. It was declared that organizations could not enforce
their claims by strikes intended to cripple interstate business
without becoming conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-
trust law. Of the control over strikes vested in the United States
courts by that decision Speer, J., says, somewhat exultingly, in
Waterhouse v. Comer:30
"In any conceivable strike upon the transportation lines of this country
whether main lines or branch roads, there will be interference with and
restraint of interstate or foreign commerce. This will be true also of strikes
upon telegraph lines for the exchange of telegraphic messages between people
of different States in interstate commerce. In the presence of these statutes
which we have recited, and in view of the intimate interchange of commodi-
ties between people of several States of the Union it will be practically impos-
sible hereafter for a body of men to combine to hinder and delay the work of
the transportation companies without becoming amenable to the provisions of
the statute. If it should be shown therefore that a strike on a single road carry-
ing interstate commerce was made with. the purpose of delaying and hindering
this commerce, they would all be guilty of a criminal conspiracy."81
But the spirit of this decision extends even further. Its logical
result is to vest United States courts with authority to enjoin
strikes or any acts in instigation of them whose concerted purpose
is to enforce any demand by crippling interstate business in any
industry whatever. It would appear that such strikes in import-
ing, wholesale and other establishments engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce would be criminal offenses against the laws of
the United States, unless the principle is modified by the appellate
courts.
The illegality of the recent strikes at Chicago seems clear in the
29 54 Fed. Rep. 966. Since affirmed on appeal, 6 Cir. Ct. of Appeals Rep.
30 Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fed. Rep. 157.,
81 On the other hand, Putnam, J., in United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed.
Rep. 605 (Circuit Court D. Mass.), says in regard to act of i8go: "If the proposi-
tion made by the United States is taken with its full force the inevitable result
will be that the Federal Court will be compelled to apply this statute to all
attempts to restrain commerce among the States or commerce with foreign
nations by strikes, boycotts, and by every method of interference by way of
violence or intimidation. It is not to be presumed that Congress intended
thus to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States without very
clear language. Such language I do not find in the statute."
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light of these decisions since the avowed purpose was to compel
railroad companies to refuse to haul Pullman cars in interstate
transit. But the same distinction must be made here as at common
law. If the strike is undertaken for a legitimate business purpose,
as to raise the wages of the strikers, neither the agreement to
strike nor the act of striking is illegal, although the incidental
effect is to suspend or hamper interstate traffic.a2
In the Toledo case already quoted, Taft, J., says:3
I IHerein is found the difference between the act of the employ6s of the
complainant company in combining to withhold the benefit of their labor from
it, and the act of the employ6s of the defendant companies in combining to
withhold their labor from them; that is, the difference between the strike and
boycott. The one combination (that is the strike), so far as its character is
shown in the evidence, was lawful, because it was for the lawful purpose of
selling the labor of those engaged in it for the highest price obtainable, and on
the best terms. The jfrobable inconvenience or loss which its employ~s
might impose on the complainant company by withholding their labor would,
under ordinary circumstances, be a legitimate means available to them for
inducing a compliance with their demands."
These cases afford no authority justifying a Court of Equity in
restraining strikers from quitting their employment. The purpose
with which a strike is undertaken may render it an atrocious ille-
gality. The exhortations, mandates or orders of executive labor
officials may be enjoined and their disobedience punished for con-
tempt, but the workmen may for all that quit work as they choose,
or when they choose, and the law cannot prevent them, although
the act of quitting work may be illegal as a breach of contract.
There are, however, scattered dicta in the cases which seems to
imply possible circumstances under which compulsory service by
equitable process would be justified.
In re Higgins, 84 "employ~s may quit their employment * * *
.provided they do not thereby intentionally disable the property.
But they must quit decently and peaceably." In the Toledo case
already quoted 3 Judge Taft said:
"But it is said that it cannot be unlawful for an employ6 either to thireaten
to quit or actually to quit the service when not in violation of his contract,
because a man has the inalienable right to bestow his labor where he will and
to withhold his labor as he will. Generally speaking, this is true, but not abgo-
lutely. If he uses the benefit which his labor is or will be to another, by
threatening to withhold it or agreeing to bestow it, or by actually withholding
32 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., U. S. Cir. Ct. of
Appeals (not yet reported).
83 Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Co. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 733.
34 27 Fed. Rep. 443.
85 54 Fed. Rep. 733.
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it or bestowing it, for the purpose of inducing, procuring or compelling that
other to commit an unlawful or criminal act, the withholding or bestowing of
his labor for such a purpose is itself an unlawful or criminal act. The same
thing is true with regard to the exercise of the right of property. A man has
the right to 'give or sell his property where he will, but if he give or sell it, or
refuse to give or sell it, as a means of inducing or compelling another to com-
mit an unlawful act, his giving or selling it or refusal to do so is itself unlaw-
ful,
In Toledo, Ann Arbor & N. M. Co. v. Penn. Co. 86 Judge Ricks
says: "In ordinary conditions, as between employer and employ6,
the privilege of the latter to quit the former's service at his option
cannot be prevented by restraint or force. The remedy by breach
of contract may follow the employer, but the employ6 has it in
his power to arbitrarily terminate the relations and abide the con-
sequences. But these relative rights and powers may become quite
different in the case of th6 employds of a great public corporation
charged by law with certain great trusts and duties to the public.
An engineer and fireman who start from Toledo with a train of
cars filled with passengers destined for Cleveland, begin that jour-
ney under contract to drive their engine and draw to the destina-
tion agreed upon. Will it be claimed that this engineer and fire-
man could quit their employment when the train is part way on its
route, and abandon it at some point where the lives of the passen-
gers would be imperilled and the safety of the property jeopar-
dized? The simple statement of the proposition carries its own
condemnation with it," and in referring to the immense losses
and public inconvenience caused by railroad strikes, and the
inadequacy of merely enjoining acts of violence and intimida-
tion, "That the necessities growing out of the vast and rapidly
multiplying interests following our extending railway business
make new and correspondingly efficient measures for relief
essential, is evident, and the courts in the exercise of their
equity jurisprudence must meet the exigencies." The case
itself did not, however, as is sup'posed, undertake to punish
an engineer for quitting employment. The defendant com-
pany and its employ6s had been enjoined from refusing to
handle interstate commerce. One of its engineers abandoned a
freight train half way on his "run" to avoid hauling cars to a
connecting interstate road under the interdict of his labor order.
But actually he remained in the employ of the company while
pretending to abandon it. And the court decided that the pre-
tence was a blind to evade the injunction, and that while in the
employ of the company he could not refuse to handle interstate
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freights by quitting work, or in any other way. But it did not
decide that he might not have quit the employment of the company
outright without violating the injunction. Judge Taft, in issuing
the original injunction, had said: 37 "Nor is the mandatory injunc-
tion against the engineers an enforced specific performance of per-
sonal service. It is only an order restraining them if they assume
to do the work of the defendant companies from doing it in a way
which will violate not only the right of the complainant, but also
the order of the court made against their employers, * * *
they may avoid obedience to the injunction by actually ceasing to
be employgs of the company, otherwise the injunction would be
in effect an order on them to remain in the service of the com-
pany, and no such order was ever, so far as the authorities show,
issued by a court of equity;" and Judge Ricks explained his own
position by saying:
"But so long as he continues in the service, so long as he undertakes to per-
form the duties of engineer or fireman or conductor, so long the power of the
court to compel him to discharge all the duties of his position is unquestion-
able, and will be exercised. As hereinbefore intimated, the duties of an
employ6 of a public corporation are such that he cannot always choose his own
time for quitting that service, and so long as he undertakes to perform, and
continues his employment, the mandatory orders of the court to compel all
lawful service can reach him and be enforced."
In Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Nor. Pac. R. Co.,3 the legal
experiment was finally made by Judge Jenkins of restraining a
strike, threatened for the express purpose of tieing up the entire
Northern Pacific road, at that time in the possession of the court
by a receivership, by enjoining the workmen from "quitting the
service of said receivers, with or without notice, so as to cripple or
prevent the operation of such road."
On appeal, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals have
stricken out the section quoted, in an opinion which in effect not
only denies the power of a Court of Equity to compel personal
service in any case, but also denies the power to Congress or legis-
latures generally to vest it with that power without a constitu-
tional amendment.
"'Under what circumstances,' says the decision, 'may the employ~s of
the receivers of right quit the service in which they are engaged? Much of
the argument of counsel was directed to this question. We shall not attempt
to lay any rule applicable to every case that may arise between employer and
employ6. If an employ6 quits without cause and in violation of an express
contract to serve for a stated time,- then his quitting would not be of right.
37 54 Fed. Rep. 733..
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But the vital question remains whether a Court of Equity will, under any cir-
cumstances, by injunction prevent one individual from quitting the personal
service of another. An affirmative answer to this question is not, we think,
justified by any authority to which our attention has been called or of which
we are aware. It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him
to work for or remain in the personal service of another. One who is placed
in such restraint is in a condition of voluntary servitude -a condition which
the supreme law of the lanud declares shall not exist anywhere within the juris-
diction of the United States.'"
This decision seems eminently wise in view of the somewhat
arbitrary power judges might have exercised over workmen by
the temporary injunction.
The very extensive powers of the United States courts as
revealed in these cases, is the legitimate consequence of the as-
sumption of control over the system of interstate commerce by the
federal government, rather than a grasping of doubtful jurisdic-
tion. How far the national government had advanced in its domi-
nance of that system has been written in the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, but remained far removed
from the ordinary apprehension until the troops of the United
States appeared to enforce its protection. This practical but per-
fectly logical result of legal principles long declared, proved so
startling to the governors of four States, that they protested against
it as illegal; although none of them undertook to show how the
national government could have power to regulate a subject by
law, and yet be powerless to enforce obedience to the law."
It has been said by an eminent authority that the United
States Courts are "sapping" the liberties of the people by their
unlimited power to punish for contempt and determine their own
jurisdiction. 9
An examination of the cases and the admission of the Chicago
strike leaders that they were beaten by the injunctions show on
the contrary that so far as their interference in strikes is con-
cerned they have been used to protect the liberty of the
public and the great commercial system of the country. Recent
events also clearly show that if courts are shorn of the protective
power the contest will become one of physical force. Is it not
rather fortunate than otherwise that judges, whose tenure of office
frees them from the subtle influence of National and State politics,
have not hesitated to take decisive steps toward the preservation
of order, while leaving labor unions abundant scope to pursue the
justifiable objects of their existence ? William P. Aiken.
89 Ex-Senator Lyman Trumbull of .Illinois, as reported by New York
World, Aug. 7, 1894.
